

The Framework

A. Heußner / T. Le Gall / G. Sutre

TACAS 2012
Tool Presentation

Backends

Algorithms

verifi
algo


Finite-Cont

comm
mat

Basic Structure



| | |
|----------------|----------------------------|
| developers | Sutre / Le Gall Heußner |
| stable release | 1.2 |
| development | active |
| written in | OCaml |
| OS | cross platform |
| distribution | source & binary |
| license | BSD |
| website | forge,wiki,... |



stem API

Basic Structure

Algorithms

verification
algorithm

controller
synthesis
algorithm

...

Finite-Control Infinite-Data Transition System API


Backends

communicating
machines

...


Formal Model

- Finite-Control Infinite-Data Transition Systems




Communicating Machines

- Finite-Control Infinite-Data Transition Systems




Communicating Machines

- a simple client-server example protocol :




Communicating Machines

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
Communicating Machines

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
Communicating Machines

- a simple client-server example protocol :




Communicating Machines

- a simple client-server example protocol :



Communicating Machines

- a simple client-server example protocol :





Verification Tool

- **safety** verification for communicating machines
- **common front end** for suite of verification algorithms
 - ▶ input : automata encoding of CM
 - ▶ output :
 - safe (guaranteed by inductive invariant)
 - unsafe + counterexample
 - unknown




Algorithms

- currently the following algos are supported
 - ▶ CEGAR
 - ▶ Abstract Interpretation
 - ▶ Abstract Regular Model Checking
 - ▶ Lazy Abstraction Refinement




Modularity by McScM






Modularity by McScM






Modularity by McScM





Modularity by McScM



Controller-Synthesis Tool

- supervisory control à la Ramadge & Wonham
 - ▶ same input (model/property) as verification tool
 - ▶ output : distributed controllers that communicate via given architecture
- includes simulator for CM

SCM Input Format

```
scm connection_disconnection :
```

```
nb_channels = 2 ;
```

```
parameters :
```

```
real o ;
```

```
real c ;
```

```
real d ;
```

```
automaton client :
```

```
initial : 0
```

```
state 0 :
```

```
to 1 : when true , 0 ! o ;
```

```
state 1 :
```

```
to 0 : when true , 0 ! c ;
```

```
to 0 : when true , 1 ? d ;
```

```
automaton server :
```

```
initial : 0
```

```
state 0 :
```

```
to 1 : when true , 0 ? o ;
```

```
state 1 :
```

```
to 0 : when true , 0 ? c ;
```

```
to 0 : when true , 1 ! d ;
```

```
bad_states:
```

```
(automaton receiver:
```

```
in 0 : true with c.(o|c)^*.#.d^*)
```

SCM Input Format

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scm connection_disconnection :
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nb_channels = 2 ;  
parameters :  
real o ;  
real c ;  
real d ;
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SCM Input Format

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nb_channels = 2 ;  
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real d ;
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to 0 : when true , 1 ? d ;
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automaton server :
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
```
to 0 : when true , 1 ! d ;
```

```
bad_states:
```

```
(automaton receiver:
```

```
in 0 : true with c.(o|c)^*.#.d^*)
```

Demo



A screenshot of a terminal window titled '~ /Workspace/mcscm_trunk — zsh — 80x24'. The window shows the command line: 'alex:~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk> ./bin/verify.native examples/scm/con_disc_reg.scm'. The terminal has a dark background and light-colored text.

Demo

```
alex:~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk> ./bin/verify.native examples/scm/con_disc_reg.scm
McScM 1.3+dev0 - Model Checking Tool
Model: 4 locations, 12 transitions, 1/2 init/error symbolic states
      Loops      Nodes      Edges   Cex Len   k
CEGAR loop:       6 (       12 /       49 /       4 )    1 )
CEGAR: 6 loops, 12 nodes, 49 edges
Result: Model is unsafe (4).
Counterexample:
  sender_0xreceiver_0 » |- 0 ! o -| » sender_1xreceiver_0 [owner=sender,C]
  sender_1xreceiver_0 » |- 0 ! c -| » sender_0xreceiver_0 [owner=sender,C]
  sender_0xreceiver_0 » |- 0 ? o -| » sender_0xreceiver_1
    [owner=receiver,U]
  sender_0xreceiver_1 » |- 1 ! d -| » sender_0xreceiver_0
    [owner=receiver,C]
Result validation:
  Validation of forward feasibility of counterexample: passed.
  Validation of backward feasibility of counterexample: passed.
Result validation: passed.
alex:~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk>
```


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alex:~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk> ./bin/verify.native examples/scm/con_disc_reg.scm
McScM 1.3+dev0 - Model Checking Tool
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  sender_1xreceiver_0 » |- 0 ! c -| » sender_0xreceiver_0 [owner=sender,C]
  sender_0xreceiver_0 » |- 0 ? o -| » sender_0xreceiver_1
    [owner=receiver,U]
  sender_0xreceiver_1 » |- 1 ! d -| » sender_0xreceiver_0
    [owner=receiver,C]
Result validation:
  Validation of forward feasibility of counterexample: passed.
  Validation of backward feasibility of counterexample: passed.
Result validation: passed.
alex:~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk>
```

Demo



A screenshot of a terminal window titled '~ /Workspace/mcscm_trunk — zsh — 80x24'. The window shows a command line with a blue oval highlighting the '-verbose' option. The command is:

```
alex:~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk> ./bin/verify.native -verbose examples/scm/con_disc  
_reg.scml
```

Demo

```
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk — zsh — 80x24
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk
alex:~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk> ./bin/verify.native -verbose examples/scm/con_disc
_reg.scm
McScM 1.3+dev0 – Model Checking Tool
Parsing input SCM description... done.
Computing global SCM by cartesian product of local systems... done.
Checking consistency of global SCM... done.
Building SCM wrapper module (with control flow automaton)... done.
Model: 4 locations, 12 transitions, 1/2 init/error symbolic states
-----
Model: Global SCM with name: connection_disconnection
Channels:
  0, 1
Variables:
Parameters:
  o, c, d
Automaton:
  All 4 locations:
    sender_0xreceiver_0
    sender_0xreceiver_1
    sender_1xreceiver_0
    sender_1xreceiver_1
  Initial locations: sender_0xreceiver_0
  Error locations: sender_0xreceiver_0, sender_1xreceiver_0
```

Demo

```
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk — zsh — 80x24
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk
sender_0xreceiver_0 » |- 0 ? o -| » sender_0xreceiver_1
[owner=receiver,U]
sender_0xreceiver_1 » |- 0 ! o -| » sender_1xreceiver_1
[owner=sender,C]
sender_0xreceiver_1 » |- 0 ? c -| » sender_0xreceiver_0
[owner=receiver,U]
sender_0xreceiver_1 » |- 1 ! d -| » sender_0xreceiver_0
[owner=receiver,C]
sender_1xreceiver_0 » |- 0 ! c -| » sender_0xreceiver_0
[owner=sender,C]
sender_1xreceiver_0 » |- 1 ? d -| » sender_0xreceiver_0
[owner=sender,U]
sender_1xreceiver_0 » |- 0 ? o -| » sender_1xreceiver_1
[owner=receiver,U]
sender_1xreceiver_1 » |- 0 ! c -| » sender_0xreceiver_1
[owner=sender,C]
sender_1xreceiver_1 » |- 1 ? d -| » sender_0xreceiver_1
[owner=sender,U]
sender_1xreceiver_1 » |- 0 ? c -| » sender_1xreceiver_0
[owner=receiver,U]
sender_1xreceiver_1 » |- 1 ! d -| » sender_1xreceiver_0
[owner=receiver,C]
Outbound transitions of each location:
sender_0xreceiver_0 :
```

Demo

```
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk — zsh — 80x24
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk
sender_0xreceiver_0 |-> { queues = {##,Top} }

Error symbolic states:
sender_0xreceiver_0 |->
{ queues = ((({c,Top}).{(o,Top)}.{(o,Top)}^*.{{(c,Top)}|
| {{(c,Top)}.{{(c,Top)}}.({{(o,Top)}^+.{{(c,Top)}}|{{(c,Top)}})^*.
| ({(o,Top)}^+.{{(##,Top)}}|{{(##,Top)}})
| {{(c,Top)}.{{(o,Top)}}.{{(o,Top)}^*.{{(##,Top)}}}
| {{(c,Top)}.{{(##,Top)}}.{{(d,Top)}}.({{(d,Top)}}^*.(_|{{(d,Top)}})
| ((({c,Top}).{(o,Top)}.{{(o,Top)}^*.{{(c,Top)}|
| {{(c,Top)}.{{(c,Top)}}.({{(o,Top)}^+.{{(c,Top)}}|{{(c,Top)}})^*.
| ({(o,Top)}^+.{{(##,Top)}}|{{(##,Top)}})
| {{(c,Top)}.{{(o,Top)}}.{{(o,Top)}^*.{{(##,Top)}}}
| {{(c,Top)}.{{(##,Top)}}.{{(d,Top)}}
| ((({c,Top}).{(o,Top)}.{{(o,Top)}^*.{{(c,Top)}|
| {{(c,Top)}.{{(c,Top)}}.({{(o,Top)}^+.{{(c,Top)}}|{{(c,Top)}})^*.
```

Demo

```
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk — zsh — 80x24
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk
{{(c,Top)}.{(##,Top)} }

CEGAR loop: 0
Abstract graph: 4 nodes, 12 edges
Closure parameter: 0

CEGAR loop: 1
Abstract graph: 5 nodes, 17 edges
Counterexample trace (1):
|- 0 ! o -|
Closure parameter: 0

CEGAR loop: 2
Abstract graph: 6 nodes, 20 edges
Counterexample trace (2):
|- 0 ? o -|, |- 0 ? c -|
Closure parameter: 0

CEGAR loop: 3
Abstract graph: 7 nodes, 25 edges
Counterexample trace (2):
|- 0 ! o -|, |- 0 ! c -|
Closure parameter: 1
```

Demo

```
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk — zsh — 80x24
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk
|- 0 ! o -|, |- 0 ! c -|, |- 0 ? o -|, |- 0 ? c -|
Closure parameter: 1


CEGAR loop: 6
Abstract graph: 12 nodes, 49 edges
Counterexample trace (4):
|- 0 ! o -|, |- 0 ! c -|, |- 0 ? o -|, |- 1 ! d -|
Counterexample valid

CEGAR: 6 loops, 12 nodes, 49 edges


---


Result: Model is unsafe (4).
Counterexample:
    sender_0xreceiver_0 » |- 0 ! o -| » sender_1xreceiver_0 [owner=sender,C]
    sender_1xreceiver_0 » |- 0 ! c -| » sender_0xreceiver_0 [owner=sender,C]
    sender_0xreceiver_0 » |- 0 ? o -| » sender_0xreceiver_1
        [owner=receiver,U]
    sender_0xreceiver_1 » |- 1 ! d -| » sender_0xreceiver_0
        [owner=receiver,C]
Result validation:
    Validation of forward feasibility of counterexample: passed.
    Validation of backward feasibility of counterexample: passed.
Result validation: passed.
alex:~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk> | ]
```

Demo



```
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk — zsh — 80x24
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk
alex@alex-MacBook-Pro: ~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk> ./bin/verify.native -mc-engine absint examples/scm /pop3.scm
```

Demo

```
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk — zsh — 80x24
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk
alex:~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk> ./bin/verify.native -mc-engine absint examples/scm
/pop3.scn
McScM 1.3+dev0 – Model Checking Tool
Model: 460 locations, 2018 transitions, 1/2 init/error symbolic states
          Loops      k
ABSINT loop:      2 )      1 )
ABSINT: 2 loops
Result: Model is safe.
Result validation:
Validation of safe forward invariant: passed.
Result validation: passed.
alex:~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk>
```

Demo

A screenshot of a terminal window on a Mac OS X system. The window title is `~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk — zsh — 80x24`. The current directory is `~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk`. The command being run is `alex:~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk> ./bin/verify.native -mc-engine cegar examples/scm/pop3.scml`. Two parts of the command are highlighted with circles: the file name `pop3.scml` is circled in pink, and the options `-mc-engine cegar` and the file path `examples/scm/pop3.scml` are circled in blue.

Demo

```
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk — zsh — 80x24
~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk
alex:~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk> ./bin/verify.native -mc-engine cegar examples/scm/pop3.scm
McScM 1.3+dev0 – Model Checking Tool
Model: 460 locations, 2018 transitions, 1/2 init/error symbolic states
      Loops      Nodes      Edges   Cex len      k
CEGAR loop: 634 ( 1345 / 11082 ) 48 / 0 )
CEGAR: 634 loops, 1345 nodes, 11082 edges
Result: Model is safe.
Result validation:
  Validation of safe forward invariant: passed.
  Validation of safe backward invariant: passed.
Result validation: passed.
alex:~/Workspace/mcscm_trunk>
```

Extended Demo Offline

Chrome File Edit View History Bookmarks Window Help

McScM - Wiki - ALTARICA

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Analysis of Concurrent Systems » McScM

Overview Download Activity Roadmap Issues Documents Wiki Files

about the tool

McScM (Model Checker for Systems of Communicating fifo Machines) is a small framework for implementing model checking algorithms in the context of infinite state systems of the form "finite control plus infinite data". The main constituent is the verify tool for the safety verification of systems of communicating fifo machines (CFM). The goal of verify is the model checking of network protocols (given as CFM) with respect to a given set of undesired behaviours or "bad" states. The main difference to other tools for communicating automata is the modeling of asynchronous, reliable fifo channels which is indispensable for checking protocols that presuppose a reliable connection between the peers (for example as supplied by TCP or MPI). Further, the verify tool allows to choose among distinct verification algorithms which are itself highly parametrizable. This leads to a generic approach that can easily be adapted to a variety of concrete safety verification problems. In addition, McScM includes a tool for supervisory control that helps to fix unsafe protocols.

how to get it

Please refer to [Download](#) for instructions.

documentation and manual pages

We provide an online manual:

- verify - safety verification
- control - supervisory control
- sccm - CFM checker

We provide a download page:

- Svar - symbolic verification
- Util - utilities

references

McScM is the outcome of the following work:

- Alexander H. Tillmann, [Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems \(TACAS'08\)](#), 2008
- Alexander H. Tillmann, [1459-09, M. S. Thesis, University of Kassel, Germany](#), 2008


or even more details:


- Alexander H. Tillmann, [1459-09, M. S. Thesis, University of Kassel, Germany](#), 2008


or take a look at the [publications](#).


The theoretical underpinnings of McScM are based on the following work:

- Gabriel Kalyanam, [Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Formal Methods for Components and Objects \(FMCOP'05\)](#), 2005













M_cS^cM Highlights

- general framework for
finite-control infinite-data transition systems
- **modular** (and well-documented) API
 - ▶ apply implemented algos directly to other FCID
 - ▶ easily prototype new algos on top
- **free** license and **open** development
- includes **verification**  & **controller-synthesis** tool

<http://altarica.labri.fr/forge/projects/mcscm>

Ongoing/Future

- input language (extended) PROMELA
- exchange of infinite data via channels
(distributed calculation, needs some theoretical work first)
- new algos (learning-based, SAT, etc.)
- new backends (“real” lossy channels)
- basis for prototypes for synthesis algos...

Related Tools/Frameworks

- SPIN - finite(!) communicating processes
- TReX - parametric + timed + data + lossy channels
- LaSH - framework for QDD, NDD, RVA
- LTSA - synchronizing finite automata, plugins
- TaPAS - VAS, Presburger Automata, reachability
- ...